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CASENOTES

ANTITRUST: Per Se Rule: Horizontal Restraints of Trade,
Absent Any Other Condemned Business Practice Are Per Se
Violations of the Sherman Act. United States v. Topco Association, 405 U.S. 596 (1972).

The Sherman Act of 1890, in pertinent part, provides as follows:

Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal.1
Since the enactment of this statute, the Supreme Court has developed two
doctrines as standards 2 to be used in interpreting the Act: the per se rule :'
to give a measure of certainty to the business community; and the rule of
reason 4 to allow business development.
1. 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970). "Were [this section]
to be read in the narrowest possible way, any commercial contract could be deemed to
violate it." United States v. Topco Assoc., 405 U.S. 596, 606 (1972). However,
Congress did not intend to prohibit all such contracts, but only those that are undue restraints of competition. See REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITrEE TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAWS 11 (1955).

2. Basically, these two doctrines are standards as to the amount of evidence a defendant is allowed to introduce into the record.
3. The per se rule gives businessmen certain guidelines as to what practices are
considered unlawful under the anti-trust laws and affords them some measure of assurance in planning their day to day business practices, The Government is also interested
in having simplified standards of illegality so that it can more easily enforce the laws.
Van Cise, The Future of Per Se in Antitrust Law, 50 VA. L. REV. 1165 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Van Cise]; Oppenheim, Federal Antitrust Legislation: Guideposts to a
Revised National Antitrust Policy, 50 MICH. L. REV. 1130 (1952).
4. Professor Bork believes that Justice Peckham actually conceived of the rule
of reason, although many other commentators believe it was first promulgated by
Chief Justice White in Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1
(1911) and United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911).
Bork
posits two divergent themes in the rule of reason: the "Peckham-Taft-White version"
and the "Brandeis version." The former is a consumer-oriented rule which permits
agreements that foster general commercial efficiency, while the latter is a produceroriented rule which allows agreements which provide greater comfort or security to
producers. Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept, Part 1, 74 YALE L.J.
775 (1965).
Oppenheim recommends that Congress declare the rule of reason to
be the standard used in evaluating business practices because the per se rule is now
without value, having become far too rigid. Oppenheim, supra note 3.
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The rule of reason allows the defendant to present evidence of all economic factors relevant to the market practice under review. The courts then
analyze the particular practice, in the context of its economic market, and decide whether or not the practice is "in restraint of trade." 5
The alternative to the rule of reason is the per se rule., A frequently
quoted, and helpful, explanation of the per se rule is provided by Justice
Black in NorthernPacific Railway v. United States':
[T]here are certain agreements or practices which because of their
pernicious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue
are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have
caused or business excuse for their use.8
As Justice Black makes clear, the rule precludes a defendant's introduction
of evidence 9 designed to show the effects of the practice on the business mar-

ket, and thereby eliminates long, costly trials, 10 voluminous records, and expansive inquiries into particular business practices."
Horizontal restraints are agreements between competitors, at the same
level of market structure, to allocate territories in order to minimize compe5. Under the "White version" of the rule of reason, the courts evaluate the purpose and effect of the agreement and relative power of the parties, to determine whether
the practices are unreasonable restraints of trade. The above test is also the one used
in the "Peckham and Taft versions" of the rule of reason to determine if the restraints are direct or indirect (Peckham) and if they are ancillary or non-ancillary
(Taft). Bork, supra note 4.
6. One of the main justifications for the per se rule is that it instills a measure of
certainty into the antitrust laws to help businessmen plan their day-to-day transactions.
Both Van Cise and Oppenheim, supra note 3, believe that businessmen prefer the flexibility of the rule of reason, since it allows an inquiry into the effects of the market
practices under review.
7. 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
8. Id.
9. Oppenheim feels that "the rules of per se violation permit the government
to sustain its burden of proof merely by showing the existence of the particular
operative facts. The defendant, precluded from showing the effects of his business practice on the particular economic market, can only deny, if possible, the
existence of the basic operative facts." Oppenheim feels that the per se rule presents
constitutional problems, and would substitute a prima facie case of illegality. Under
this approach, after the government shows the existence of the restrictive agreement,
the defendant would then have the burden of proceeding with rebuttal evidence to
show justification for the agreement. Oppenheim, supra note 3 at 1150-1151, 11561161. Van Cise believes that per se raises a rebuttable presumption, which the defendant may refute by a showing of a lawful main purpose. Supra note 3.
10. For example, the trial in the case of United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co.,
388 U.S. 365 (1967) lasted 70 days and cost Schwinn $400,000. In an amicus brief
filed by Restonic Corporation in United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967),
Restonic alleged that it agreed to its consent decree solely to avoid the expense of an
antitrust action. Averill, Sealy, Schwinn and Sherman One, 15 N.Y.L.F. 39, 60 n.125
(1969).
11. Northern Pacific Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5.
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tition 1 2 and are among the business arrangements proscribed by the per
se doctrine. In the past, such restraints brought the per se rule into operation when combined with some other form of restrictd practice.'3
However, in the recent case of United States v. Topco Association,'1 4 the
Supreme Court held that horizontal market restrictions, standing alone,' are
per se violations of § 1 of the Sherman Act.
Topco is a food cooperative founded by a group of small grocery stores and
grocery chains' 6 to increase their buying power, in response to the domination of the food industry by the large national chains. 17 The chains, in an
attempt to increase their profits, have marketed private label products'S-the
familiar in-house brands, such as Ann Page (A & P) and Town House (Safeway). Small independent groceries and local chains, lacking the sales vol12. See generally, Comment, Horizontal Territorial Restraints and the Per Se Rule,
28 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 457 (1971).
13. Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951) (horizontal
allocation of markets, price-fixing, participation in cartel).
United States v. National Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319 (1946) (horizontal allocation of markets, participation
in a cartel, patent pooling). United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 175 U.S. 211
(1899) aff'g 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898) (horizontal allocation of markets and price
fixing). United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967) (horizontal allocation of
markets and price fixing). Serta Assoc. Inc. v. United States, 393 U.S. 534 (1969),
aff'g 296 F. Supp. 1121 (N.D. Iil. 1968) (horizontal market allocations and price
fixing).
14. 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
15. In United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967), the only issue before the
Supreme Court was Sealy's market allocations. However, the Court found that the
territorial restrictions were such an integral part of the unlawful price fixing scheme,
that both had to be considered together. Further, Justice Fortas, in Sealy, hypothesized the Topco case:
It is argued, for example, that a number of small grocers might allocate
territory among themselves on an exclusive basis as incident to the use of a
common name and advertisements, and that this sort of venture should be
welcomed in the interests of competition, and should not be condemned as per
se unlawful.
388 U.S. at 357. For a discussion of Sealy, see McClaren, Territorial & Customer Restrictions, Consignments, Suggested Resale Prices & Refusals to Deal, 37 A.B.A. ANnTRUST L.J. 137 (1968).
16. The District Court filed extensive findings of fact with its opinion, which is
found in United States v. Topco Assoc., 319 F. Supp. 1031 (1970).
The brief for
Topco filed with the United States Supreme Court gives extensive background information on the nature of the cooperative, its practices, and the nature of the food industry.
17. Led by A&P, the food industry has changed from a business characterized by
the familiar "ma and pa" corner grocery store to one that is dominated by large national food chains. In 1970, A&P's 4,482 stores produced a retail sales volume of almost $6 billion. Second-ranked Safeway, with 2,204 stores, had a retail sales volume
of over $4 billion, and third ranked Kroger, with 1,529 stores had a sales volume of
about $3.5 billion. Chainstore Guide, Supermarket, Grocery and Convenience Store
Chains (1971).
18. The chains either arrange their own sources of food supply or manufacture
their own goods, and then place their trademarks on the finished products. The result
is merchandise which yields higher profits than nationally advertised brands while
selling for 20% less. Private labels allow the chains to experiment with loss leader and
traffic building specials and help attract customer loyalty and good will.
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ume' 9 needed for the development of their own private label programs, have
been forced out of business 20 by the high costs and low profit margins of nationally advertised brands. To avoid such results, Topco 2' was formed to
develop a private label program for its members, who each hold the same
amount of common stock-the only class of stock with voting rights-regardless of size. 22 The only joint activity of the Topco members is their association in the cooperative. They are distinct and separate corporations, with no
pooling of earnings, profits, resources or management. There is no integration of promotional resources or common corporate identity to permit
combined advertising of the Topco products.
Topco's only function is the procurement of food and related non-food
items and their distribution under the Topco trademarks to its members.
Included in the association's operations are the development of quality specifications, product testing, and quality control. While members buy Topco
products at cost, they are permitted to resell at any price they choose. 23
Each member can adopt his own merchandising strategy, advertise and promote products as he sees fit, and exercise his absolute discretion as to locations
and number of stores. 24 The only restriction that Topco placed upon its
members was the requirement that members acquire a license to sell Topco
25
brands in a particular geographical location.
In 1968, the Justice Department filed a complaint 26 against Topco, alleg19. An effective private label program requires an annual sales volume of $250

million or more. In 1967, Topco's individual member's sales volume ranged from $1.6
million to $182.8 million, and 18 of its then 26 members were well under $100 million.
319 F. Supp. at 1031.

20. The total number of grocery stores declined from a peak of 386,897 in 1937 to
244,833 in 1963. 319 F. Supp. at 1035.
21. Topco (incorporated name is Topco Associates, Inc.) is the successor to Food

Cooperative, Inc. founded in 1944. It is a cooperative corporation organized under the
laws of the State of Wisconsin. 319 F. Supp. at 1031.
22. Topco members also own preferred stock according to a formula based upon

total retail sales for the previous year. Preferred stock (and bank credit) provide the
working capital requirements of Topco. Brief for Petitioner at 11, United States v.
Topco Assoc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
23. There were never any allegations that Topco and its members were engaged in

price fixing.
24. Topco members may expand whenever and wherever they choose, with as many
stores as they wish. If they wish to use the Topco brands in the new stores, they then

request a license from the cooperative. Supra, note 22 at 17.
25. Article IX § 2 of the Topco bylaws establishes three categories of licenses:
(a) Exclusive-the member is licensed to sell Topco products to the exclusion of
all others.

(b) Non-exclusive-the member is licensed to sell Topco products, but not to the
exclusion of others.
(c) Coextensive-two or more members are licensed to sell Topco products to the
exclusion of all others.
26. United States v. Topco, complaint no. 68 C76 (1970), filed by the government

in the United States District Court, N.D. Illinois.
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ing a violation of §1 of the Sherman Act by its allocation of exclusive territories to members. 2 7 Topco's response admitted the existence of such restrictions, but argued that exclusivity was the only viable method by which members could be guaranteed the benefits of a private label program. 28 The restrictions, then, were ancillary to a legitimate business activity 2 -the creation
and promotion of competition between its members and the large dominant
chains.
The government, conceding that exclusivity is integral to the success of a
private label program, admitted that, if Topco were an integrated national
chain, its private label program would not violate the antitrust laws.3 0 It also
conceded that Topco's private label program engineered more effective competition with its much larger rivals.3' However, the Government contended
that Topco's practices were illegal per se since they restrained intrabrand
32
competition.
The District Court, finding in favor of Topco, made a careful study of the
food industry and its practices, and analyzed Topco's business practices in the
context of the composition of the food industry. It concluded that, far from
restraining trade, Topco's licensing arrangements actually increased interbrand competition and this far out-weighed any diminution of intrabrand
competition.33 Further, it found:
[T]he relief which the government here seeks would not increase
competition in Topco private label brands but would substantially
diminish competition in the supermarket field. The antitrust laws
are certainly not intended to accomplish such a result. Only the
national chains and the other supermarkets who compete with
Topco members would be benefitted. The consuming public ob34
viously would not.
27. The Government also challenged Topco's wholesaling agreements, but Topco
objected on the grounds that this issue was not alleged in the complaint. The District
Court heard evidence on this point, agreeing that if the Government proved their allegations, it could amend its complaint. The District Court did make findings and conclusions as to this issue, although the Government never formally amended its complaint.
The Supreme Court struck down the wholesaling agreements, although all but one
paragraph of the Topco opinion discussed the licensing agreements. United States v.
Topco Assoc., 405 U.S. at 604, 612.
28. Top officers of a number of member stores testified "unequivocally that they
would not spend the money, time, and energy necessary to establish . . . Topco brands
in their stores if their substantial competitors could sell the same brands ... and would
not continue as members of Topco ..
" 319 F. Supp. at 1040.
29. Justice Taft's view of the rule of reason was that, to be lawful, an agreement
eliminating competition must be subordinate and necessary to another legitimate transaction. Bork, supra note 4.
30. 319 F. Supp. at 1040.
31. id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 1043.
34. Id. (emphasis added).
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Thus, without so specifying, the lower court grounded its decision upon the
rule of reason.
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the District Court, 35 finding
Topco's licensing arrangements to be horizontal restraints of trade and, thus,
a per se violation of § 1.36 The application of the per se rule was defended
on the following grounds:
Whether or not we would decide this case the same way under
the rule of reason used by the District Court is irrelevant to the issue before us. The fact is that Courts are of limited utility in examining difficult economic problems. Our inability to weigh, in
any meaningful sense, destruction of competition in one sector of
the economy against promotion of competition in another
sector
7
is one important reason we have formulated per se rulesa
The theory presented, then, is that the courts, inherently ill-equipped to deal
with certain business practices, should not delve too deeply into economic
considerations.
To bolster the argument that horizontal restraints of trade have always
been considered illegal per se, the Court cited a line of cases, 88 purportedly
illustrating that it has never inquired into the harm the practice has caused or
the validity of its existence. However, Chief Justice Burger, in his lone dissent, distinguished each of these cases by showing that, prior to Topco, horizontal restraints of trade have been declared per se violations of Sherman
One only when combined with some other proscribed business practice. The
Chief Justice maintained that, rather than following precedent, the Court had
established a new per se rule under which all horizontal restraints are prohibited, even absent any findings of other illegal activities. Further, he accused the Court of abdicating its responsibilities in the antitrust field solely in
the interests of judicial economy, thereby leaving Congress to fill the void by
9
exemption of certain activities from the per se classification.3
Both the majority and the dissenting opinions clearly illustrate the courts'
feelings of discomfort with certain economic practices, when the ramifications
for other segments of the economy are in doubt. This discomfort underscores
many of the decisions in the antitrust field and has led to the application of
the per se rule in order to avoid the lengthy probing needed to make an
economic analysis. A noted commentator, Oppenheim, has written:
35. The Government appealed directly to the Supreme Court pursuant to § 2 of the
Expediting Act, 32 Stat. 823, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 29 (1970).
36. 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
37. Id. at 609.
38. id. at 606-10.
39. [d. at 613-24.
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[T]here has been increasing resort to the rigid confines of per se
violation rules-a delusive certainty through mechanized enforcement at the expense of the flexibility needed to deal with the actualities of imperfect competition and especially the problems of
industrial concentration in big business units among both sellers
40
and buyers.
Oppenheim would have Congress expressly adopt the rule of reason as the
standard to be used in evaluating market practices, and abandon altogether
the per se rule. He has also suggested that Congress declare that the competition it seeks to foster is "workable competition," a concept allowing the
consideration of all relevant market factors. 41 This suggestion, however,
would not allay the courts' fears that they are ill-equipped to deal with vast
reams of economic data.
One way to avoid the difficulties inherent in antitrust cases is for the
courts to appoint economists as special masters to assist in analyzing the complex economic problems presented in the antitrust field. Rule 53 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure expressly permits a master's appointment when
the issues are complicated (in a jury trial) or, when some exceptional condition requires it (in a non-jury trial). Surely antitrust suits would qualify,
since the results, in these cases, have ramifications difficult to envision. Further, the use of special masters might end the judicial groping for a solution
which Justice Marshall has characterized as "rambl[ing] through the wilds
of economic theory."'42 This suggestion contemplates the defendant's presentation of all relevant economic data, such as market practices and market
power, even if the government alleges a per se violation of the Sherman Act,
and an evaluation made in light of the concept of "workable competition."
There are several advantages to this approach. First, it would free the
courts' dockets by removing the lengthy antitrust litigation. Second, the term
"competition" would become primarily an economic one, and the determination of its existence would be made by one who has the expertise and time to
consider the possible ramifications of the market practice. Third, since the
master's findings would be accepted unless "clearly erroneous," the lower
courts will be spared the dilemma they had previously faced: i.e., either
grant the government summary judgment on a complaint alleging a per se
40. Oppenheim, supra note 3, at 1145. Oppenheim was the co-chairman of the
Attorney General's National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws.
41. Competition, in one sense, denotes the presence of more than one seller in a
market and identifies a condition of rivalry among them. "Workable competition concentrates on the effective limits it sets on the power of the seller to control its prices.
The concept of 'workable competition' considers all relevant market factors, such as
size and strength of sellers, independence of rivals, rate of growth, and ability of other
firms to enter the field." EINHORN AND SMITH, ECONOMIC AspEcTs OF ANTITRUST 1968.
42. 405 U.S. at 610.
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violation, which the Supreme Court may remand, seeking more information, 41 or take evidence and compile a record, only to have the Supreme
Court decide the case under the per se rule. 44 Thus the economic evaluation becomes the basis of the lower court decision, leaving the issue on appeal
whether the Sherman Act was correctly applied to the evaluation.
So long as the courts are reluctant to grapple with complex theories, the confusion that exists in the antitrust field will remain. Topco is the
perfect illustration of this. The grocery store business is already an oligopoly, 45 with the big chains controlling the market. Yet the chains' private
label programs can retain their exclusivity because the companies are vertically integrated. Topco's program, however, cannot retain its exclusivity because its members are not so integrated, even though its program promotes
competition. Surely, Congress in passing the Sherman Act, did not contemplate that a concededly pro-competitive practice would be declared illegal because of the courts' adherence to the per se doctrine. If the approach suggested here had been utilized, there would have been no justification for invalidating Topco's practice since it did in fact foster competition.
Joanne Sgro

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Right to Counsel-Absent Knowing and Intelligent Waiver, No Person May be Imprisoned for
Any Offense, Whether Classified as Petty, Misdemeanor or Felony, Unless He Was Represented by Counsel at His Trial.-Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972).

In the state of Florida, Jon Argersinger, an indigent, was charged with carrying a concealed weapon, an offense punishable by a $1000.00 fine and imprisonment for up to six months.' Despite the defendant's request made to
the court, to have counsel supplied him, none was appointed; the defendant
43. See e.g., White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963).
44. United States v. Topco Assoc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
45. "Oligopoly markets" are defined as those where industrial concentration is mani-

fested in the small number of relatively large sellers, who account for the major part of
total production and sales, with proportionate power to influence market price appreciably through decreases or increases in output. Oppenheim, supra note 3, at 1185.
1.

FLA. STAT. ANN.

§ 790.01 (1965).
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was found guilty, and sentenced to ninety days in jail. On the basis of the
state's refusal to provide counsel, Argersinger brought a habeas corpus action
in the Florida Supreme Court. The court denied the motion, 2 following the
reasoning of Brinson v. Florida,3 that the right to court-appointed counsel extends only to trials for non-petty offenses punishable by imprisonment of
more than six months. The United States Supreme Court granted a writ of
certiorari, 4 and reversed saying: "absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no
person may be imprisoned for any offense, whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony, unless he was represented by counsel at his trial." 5
In the majority opinion of Argersinger v. Hamlin, Justice Douglas traced
the applicability of the sixth amendment to the states in certain "fundamental" areas of due process. 6 He noted that "[w]hile there is historical support for limiting the 'deep commitment' to trial by jury to 'serious criminal
cases,' there is no such support for a similar limitation on the right to assistance of counsel."' 7 Asserting that the sixth amendment extends the right to
counsel "beyond its common law dimensions,"" the decision rejects ".

.

. the

premise that since prosecutions for crimes punishable by imprisonment for
less than six months may be tried without a jury, they may also be tried without a lawyer."
The Argersinger Court recognized the unique severity of incarceration per
se, regardless of the length of sentence. Alluding to an earlier decision, Justice Douglas wrote: "[T]he prospect of imprisonment for however short a
time will seldom be viewed by the accused as a trivial or 'petty' matter and
may well result in quite serious repercussions affecting his career and his reputation."' 10 The Court does not direct the states in the matter of classifying
crimes,"1 but only requires that a defendant not be imprisoned for any offense
unless he has had an opportunity to be represented by counsel.' 2 Simply
2. State ex rel. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 236 So. 2d 442 (Fla. 1970).
3. 273 F. Supp. 840 (S.D. Fla. 1967).
4. 401 U.S. 908 (1971).
5. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972).
6. Id. at 27-29.
7. Id. at 30.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 30-31.
10. Id. at 37, quoting from Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 73 (1970).
11. 407 U.S. at 38.
12. Strictly reading Argersinger, it holds not that counsel be appointed in all cases
where incarceration is a statutory possibility, but that in cases where a defendant does
go to jail he must have had the opportunity to have been represented by counsel.
Thus, judicial economy can be served by courts making pre-trial determinations not to
incarcerate. Chief Justice Burger, concurring in Argersinger, suggests that "the trial
judge and prosecutor . . . engage in a predictive evaluation of each case to determine
whether there is a significant likelihood that, if the defendant is convicted, the trial
judge will sentence him to a jail term. The judge can preserve the option of a jail
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stated, "[t]he assistance of counsel is often a requisite to the very existence of
a free trial.' 1 3 The Court recognized certain problems that beleaguer the
misdemeanant who is unable to afford counsel. For example, absent counsel, a defendant is often faced with what the Court calls "thorny constitutional questions,"1 4 and must contend with the courts' "obsession for speedy
dispositions" of misdemeanors, that results in "assembly-line justice."' 15 To
meet the present and future need (presumably increased, in the wake of this
decision) for legal counsel, Justice Brennan, in a concurring opinion, suggested that the increased participation of law students in clinical, in-court
programs may be an added source of legal assistance.1 6
Justice Powell, although stating in his concurring opinion that he is "...
in
accord with the Court that an indigent accused's need for the assistance of
counsel does not mysteriously evaporate when he is charged with an offense
punishable by six months or less,"' 17 did not opt in favor of the rule expressed
in the majority opinion. Rather, Justice Powell favored, ". . . the principle
of due process that requires fundamental fairness in criminal trials, a principle
which . . . encompasses the right to counsel in petty cases whenever the assistance of counsel is necessary to assure a fair trial." 18 Thus, Justice Powell
did not consider it a given, as does Justice Douglas, that representation by
counsel is the sine qua non of a fair trial, even in cases where incarceration is
a possible outcome. Justice Powell further stated that he opposes the "mechanistic application"' 19 of the majority in Argersinger and is critical of fashioning ". . . a new constitutional rule with consequences of such unknown
dimensions, especially since it is supported neither by history nor prece20
dent.,'
sentence only by offering counsel to any defendant unable to retain counsel on his
own." 407 U.S. at 42 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
13. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932).
14. 407 U.S. at 33. Justice Douglas cites Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156
(1972) as an example of a case dealing with such "thorny constitutional questions."
There, a Jacksonville, Florida "vagrancy ordinance" was held "void for vagueness."
Although Justice Douglas, writing the majority opinion in Papachristou, did not explicitly refer to the right to counsel, he did suggest the inference that lack of counsel
could create a special burden when scrutinizing the constitutionality of a statute stating
that "[tihe poor among us, the minorities, the average householder are not in business
and not alerted to the regulatory schemes of vagrancy laws; and we assume they would
have no understanding of their meaning and impact if they read them." 405 U.S. at
162-63.
15. 407 U.S. at 34-36.
16. Id. at 41.
17. Id. at 47.
18. Id. (emphasis added).
19. Id. at 49.
20. Id. at 52. Justice Powell is perhaps overstating his fear. Since the Gideon
decision it has been the practice in the states of Illinois, Massachusetts, Minnesota,
New Hampshire, Oregon and Texas, to make counsel available to indigent criminal

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 22:684

Prior to Argersinger, the case law regarding the requirement of counsel in
other than felony cases was divided. In March of 1963, in Gideon v. Wainwright, the United States Supreme Court held that the right to counsel is a
fundamental prerequisite to a free trial. 21 In Gideon, the Court quoted with
approval from Justice Sutherland's opinion in Powell v. Alabama:22
The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it
did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. Even the
intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill
in the science of law. .

.

. He lacks both the skill and knowledge

adequately to prepare his defense, even though he have a perfect
one. He requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the
28
proceedings against him.
Although Gideon dealt with an individual convicted of a felony, who had
received a one year prison sentence, 24 the language of the opinion was extremely general. Nowhere in the opinion is it stated that the right to counsel
is restricted to non-petty offenses, or felonies. 2n In fact, the word "felony" is
never mentioned in any of the four Gideon opinions except in describing the
offense under which Gideon was tried. 26 The Gideon Court stated that
". ..in our adversary system of criminal justice, any person haled into court,
who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel
'27
is provided for him."
Following the Gideon decision, several courts held that defendants in nonfelony cases were entitled to state-appointed counsel. The broadest interpretation of Gideon granted counsel to all indigent defendants in all criminal
cases, regardless of the penalty or charge. Notably, in the Fifth Circuit
there were several decisions that interpreted Gideon to encompass all nonfelony cases. 28 Other courts have also elected to follow this expanded interdefendants where the offense was one for which they could possibly be imprisoned.
Infra, note 33. In addition, Rule 44(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,
as amended in 1966, provides counsel to ".

.

. [e]very defendant unable to obtain

counsel . .. unless he waives such appointment." (emphasis added). Such practices
both serve as "precedent," and give a realistic idea of the consequences of such
"unknown" dimensions.

21. 372 U.S. 335, 341-45 (1963). "The right of one charged with crime to counsel
may not be deemed fundamental and essential to fair trials in some countries, but it
is in ours." Id. at 344.
22.

287 U.S. 45 (1932).

23. 372 U.S. at 344-45, quoting from Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932).
24. Gideon was convicted of breaking and entering with intent to commit a misdemeanor. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 810.05 (1965).
25. See text accompanying note 31, infra.
26. Arbo v. Hegstrom, 261 F. Supp. 397, 400 (D. Conn. 1966).

27. 372 U.S. at 344 (emphasis added).
28.

See, e.g., Bohr v. Purdy, 412 F.2d 321 (5th Cir. 1969); James v. Headley,

410 F.2d 325 (5th Cir. 1969); Goslin v. Thomas, 400 F.2d 594 (5th Cir. 1968);
McDonald v. Moore, 353 F.2d 106 (5th Cir. 1965); Harvey v. Mississippi, 340
F.2d 263 (5th Cir. 1965).
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pretation of Gideon.29 The Washington Supreme Court applied Gideon to
misdemeanors in the case of City of Tacoma v. Heater3 0 where it held:
".. . every defendant has a constitutional right to counsel in all criminal
prosecutions. The [United States Supreme] Court [in Gideon] made no distinction between misdemeanors and felonies insofar as the applicability of this
3
provision is concerned." '
In contrast to those courts that interpreted Gideon as applying to all of-

fenses, several courts took the approach that required the availability of
court-appointed counsel only in cases where the defendant was charged with
a "serious offense."'3 2 Problems arose as to how to define "serious offense,"
and courts looked to "a variety of factors"3 3 in their determinations of "seriousness."'34 The "serious offense" approach did not obviate all problems in
interpreting Gideon. For example, a defendant in a New York case, 85 with
a possible period of incarceration of forty-two to 177 days, was denied counsel
because the offenses charged were "traffic violations."136 This particular case
calls special attention to such troublesome distinctions as "felony-misdemeanor," and "serious offense-petty offense." Argersinger addressed this problem in suggesting that titles should be disregarded in applying Gideon, the
crucial point being jeopardy of incarceration.37
This approach was followed by several pre-Argersinger courts that used
only the criterion of threat of incarceration, in deciding whether or not to require the availability of counsel.38 The Supreme Court of Minnesota used
29. See, e.g., State v. Blank, 241 Ore. 627, 405 P.2d 373 (1965); City of Tacoma
v. Heater, 67 Wash, 2d 733, 409 P.2d 867 (1966).
30. 67 Wash. 2d 733, 409 P.2d 867 (1966).
31. Id. at 734, 409 P.2d at 869.
32. By 1970, twelve states were using this distinction. See, infra, note 33.
33. Comment, Right to Counsel: The Impact of Gideon v. Wainwright in the Fifty
States, 3 CREIGHTON L. REv. 103, 119-24 (1970).
34. See, e.g., Irvin v. State, 44 Ala. App. 101, 203 So. 2d 283 (1967); State v. Anderson, 96 Ariz. 123, 392 P.2d 784 (1964); State ex rel. Taylor v. Warden, 193 So. 2d
606 (Fla. 1967); Brinson v. Florida, 273 F. Supp. 840 (S.D. Fla. 1967).
35. People v. Letterio, 16 N.Y.2d 307, 213 N.E.2d 670, 266 N.Y.S.2d 368 (1955),
cert. denied, 384 U.S. 911 (1966).
36. Letterio was sentenced to 42 days with an additional 135 days imprisonment if
he were to default on a $1,030.00 fine. Bergan, J., concurring, explained the absence
of a need of counsel, stating, "The basic concept of the traffic infraction is that a
traffic violation is not a crime and the violator not a criminal." 16 N.Y.2d at 307, 213
N.E.2d at 670, 266 N.Y.S.2d at 672. What is the difference whether the charge is
labeled a "crime" or a "traffic offense" if the result is the same? "The petitioner would
be as effectively deprived of his liberty by a sentence to a year in jail for the crime of
non-support of a minor child as by a sentence to a year in jail for any other crime,
however serious." Evans v. Rives, 75 U.S. App. D.C. 242, 247, 126 F.2d 633, 638
(1942).
37. Supra, note 10.
38. See, e.g., In re Johnson, 62 Cal. 2d 325, 398 P.2d 420, 42 Cal. Rptr. 228
(1965); People v. Witenski, 15 N.Y.2d 392, 207 N.E.2d 358, 259 N.Y.S.2d 413
(1965); Application of Stevenson, 254 Ore. 94, 458 P.2d 414 (Ore. 1969).
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this standard when it held that the courts of that state must provide counsel
".. in any case. . . which may lead to incarceration in a penal institution
[I]f the court is to impose a jail sentence, counsel should be furnished." '39 Expanding somewhat on the interpretation of Gideon that applies only to cases of incarceration, an additional approach 40 has been to
make counsel available in cases where incarceration is a penalty and in cases
where the offense charged is serious (e.g., the loss of a driver's license or
simply, a conviction to which stigma might attach). 41
Despite the creativity with which Gideon had been construed, many courts
were hesitant in reading too much into the Gideon opinion. Following Justice Harlan's assertion 42 that Gideon did not extend counsel to all criminal
cases, these courts applied Gideon strictly to its facts, requiring counsel only
in felony cases. These courts did not consider the penalty as the determinative factor, but chose to follow the older distinction as to the type of crime
being tried. The Florida Supreme Court, in the wake of the reversal of its
Gideon decision, held, in a later case, 43 that ". . . until authoritatively determined to the contrary by the Supreme Court of the United States, the rule
in Florida is that there is no absolute organic right to counsel in misdemeanor
trials."'44 Notwithstanding the decisions of the fifth circuit, the Florida Supreme Court doggedly refused to apply Gideon to anything "less" than a felony. The court could ". . . find nothing conclusively, that [states that
Gideon] was intended to apply to all crimes . . .-14 Similarly, in the Supreme Court of Connecticut 46 and, in an Ohio appellate court, 47 indigent defendants in misdemeanor prosecutions were not entitled to appointed counsel.
In 1966, the United States Supreme Court had the opportunity to clarify
Gideon but denied certiorari to two petitioners who had asserted that Gideon
applied when a misdemeanor conviction could result in incarceration. 48 Justice Stewart's dissenting opinion foreshadowed Argersingerin stating:
In Gideon v. Wainwright. . . we said that "any person haled into
court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair
39. State v. Borst, 278 Minn. 388, 397, 154 N.W.2d 888, 894 (1967).
40. See, e.g., James v. Headley, 410 F.2d 325 (5th Cir. 1969).
41. This view of approaching right to counsel problems on a case by case basis, is
reflected in Justice Powell's concurring opinion in Argersinger, appointing counsel

whenever it ".

.

. is necessary to assure a fair trial." 407 U.S. at 47.

42. 372 U.S. at 351 (concurring opinion).

43. Watkins v. Morris, 179 So. 2d 348 (Fla. 1965).
44. Id. at 349.
45. Fish v. State, 159 So. 2d 866 (Fla. 1964).
46. State v. Davis, 2 Conn. Cir. 257, 197 A.2d 668 (1963).
47. City of Toledo v. Frazier, 10 Ohio App. 2d 51, 226 N.E.2d 777 (1967).
48. Winter v. Beck, 239 Ark. 1093, 397 S.W.2d 364, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 907
(1966); DeJoseph v. Connecticut, 3 Conn. Cir. 624, 222 A.2d 752, cert. denied,
385 U.S. 982 (1966).

1973]

Case Notes

trial unless counsel is provided for him."

. . .No state should be

permitted to repudiate those words by 49arbitrarily attaching the
label "misdemeanor" to a criminal offense.
In a similar development, the Court denied certiorari to a Connecticut petitioner 50 convicted of being intoxicated-an offense for which he could serve
as much as thirty days in jail."' Justice Fortas, dissenting, argued that the
Court missed an important opportunity to decide whether the Gideon "...
guarantee of counsel applies to . . . relatively 'minor' offenses or misdemea-

5 2
nors carrying significant penalties for their violation."
Jon Argersinger's petition for certiorari again gave the Court the opportunity to deal dispositively with Gideon. In some courts the Argersinger decision
may be viewed as an expansion of Gideon; to others itis a restriction on the
scope of the sixth amendment. Either view would hold that it represents a
modification and change of Gideon. This writer views Argersinger as further defining what had previously been said concerning the right to counsel. 53
It does not restrict the scope of Gideon so much as it continues the groundwork previously laid by the Court. Argersinger v. Hamlin is a logical and
just explication of the Gideon philosophy. The only remaining question is
why the Burger Court, and not the Warren Court, produced this opinion.

Kenneth M. Trombly

Administrative Law-Unfair Practices-F.T.C.-Power to
Determine Unfair Practices Is Not Limited to Violations of
the Letter or Spirit of the Antitrust Laws-FTC v. Sperry
& Hutchinson Company, 405 U.S. 233 (1972).

In a 1968 cease and desist order, the Federal Trade Commission attempted
to halt the Sperry & Hutchinson (S&H) Company's practice of "suppressing"
49. Winter v. Beck, 385 U.S. 907, 908 (1966)

(Stewart, J.,dissenting).

50. Heller v. Connecticut, 154 Conn. 743, 226 A.2d 521, cert. denied, 389 U.S.
902 (1967).
51. CoNNS. GEN. STAT. REV.§ 53-246 (1968).
52. 389 U.S. at 903.
53. According to Justice Douglas, the Gideon opinion

"...

did not limit . . . the

need of the accused for a lawyer. .." to felony cases. 407 U.S. at 31. Its application
was apparently left to later judicial inferences, thus producing Argersinger.
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the operation of unauthorized trading stamp exchanges.' For many years
S&H, a giant in the trading stamp industry, had waged legal battles, usually
successful ones, in state courts against non-contracting local retailers and
stamp exchanges which exchanged or redeemed S&H's well known "green
stamps". 2 Despite S&H's string of state court victories, the Federal Trade
Commission charged that the company's interference with the "free and
open" redemption of trading stamps was an unfair method of competition
and an unfair act or practice in violation of Section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act.a
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the Commission order
on the grounds that the Federal Trade Commission's power under Section 5
was restricted to violations of the letter or spirit of the antitrust laws, and
that no such violation had been demonstrated from S&H's conduct. 4 On review, 5 the Supreme Court unanimously voted (7-0) to modify and remand
the case, not on the basis of the lower court's finding but rather on its misconstruction of the Commission's authority under Section 5. Speaking for
the Court, Mr. Justice White agreed that no anti-trust violation was shown,
but found that, in view of the legislative and judicial history of Section 5, the
Federal Trade Commission's power to determine unfair or deceptive acts
and practices was meant to extend beyond the realm of commercial competition to the area of consumer protection. 6
As originally enacted in 1914, Section 5 of the F.T.C. Act entrusted the
Federal Trade Commission with the power to prevent "unfair methods of
competition". 7 The Commission was also to enforce the Sherman and
Clayton Acts, the chief federal antitrust statutes. Congress had deliberately
left Section 5 authority ambiguous because of the impossibility of encompassing all possible unfair trade practices in statutory form and the desire to
create a flexible authority to deal with the imaginativeness of the business
8
world.
In early decisions defining the sweep of the Commission's power, the
Supreme Court was reluctant to construe that power much beyond the scope
1. 73 FTC 1099 (1968).
2. From 1904 to 1966, S&H was involved in 43 actions in eight federal districts
and 19 states to enjoin the unauthorized use of its trading stamps. The requested relief was granted in all 43 cases. Sperry & Hutchinson v. F.T.C., 432 F.2d 146, 149
(1970).
3. Federal Trade Commission Act, 38 Stat. 719 (1914), as amended 15 U.S.C.
§ 45(a)(1) (1970).
4. Sperry & Hutchinson v. F.T.C., 432 F.2d 146 (1970).
5. F.T.C. v. Sperry & Hutchinson, 405 U.S. 233 (1972).
6. Id. at 244.
7. Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(6) (1970).
8. See S. RaP. No. 597, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1914); H.R. REP. No. 1142,
63d Cong., 2d Sess. 18-19 (1914).
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of the antitrust statutes which the Commission enforced. In a 1920 decision, F.T.C. v. Gratz,9 the Court restricted the Commission's power to those
practices previously determined to be "opposed to good morals because
characterized by deception, bad faith, fraud

. . .

, or as against public policy

because of their dangerous tendency to hinder competition or create monopoly". 10 Eleven years later, in F.T.C. v. Raladam," the Court held
that the purpose of Section 5 was limited to
the protection of the public from the evils likely to result from the
destruction of competition or the restriction of it to a substantial
degree; and this presupposes the existence of some substantial competition to be affected since the public is not concerned in the 1main2
tenance of competition which itself is without real substance.
The Court began a deviation from this line of reasoning in 1934 with its
decision in F.T.C. v. R. F. Keppel & Bros, Inc.13 That case involved a
candy merchandising scheme which exploited children by inducing their purchase of a cheaper candy with the chance of winning bonuses or prizes. The
Court ruled that despite the fact this was not really an anti-competitive practice, it was "a competitive method . . .to exploit consumers" and contrary

to public policy. 14 In an abrupt switch, the Court reasoned that the absence
of any clear antitrust restrictions in Section 5 indicated a legislative intent
to extend Commission authority into such areas of immoral trade practices.' 5
The Court in S&H placed heavy emphasis on the Keppel & Bros. opinion
and the subsequent addition of the Wheeler-Lea Amendment in 1938.1 6
The Amendment added the phrase "unfair or deceptive acts or practices in
commerce" to Section 5 and, the Court believed, left no doubt that Section 5
was meant to have a separate consumer protection nature.
Despite the Wheeler-Lea Amendment, the Federal Trade Commission
remained unsure of its range of powers to protect consumers. During the
next 30 years most Commission rulings invoking the Section 5 language
were carefully grounded on evidence of any particular practice's effect on
competitors as well as consumers. Where little actual effect on competition
could be demonstrated, the Wheeler-Lea term "unfair" was generally assumed to operate only in conjunction with such other terms as "deceptive,"
"false" and "misleading"-indicating serious immoral practices. The Coin9. 253 U.S. 421 (1920).
10. Id. at 427.
11. 283 U.S. 643 (1931).
12.. Id. at 647.
13. 291 U.S. 304 (1934).
14. Id. at 312.
15. Id. at 310.
16. 52 Stat. 111, amending 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1938). See also H.R. REP. No. 1613,
75th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1937) and S. REP. No. 1705, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1936).
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mission did not attempt to issue a cease and desist order outside the anticompetition area solely on the grounds of its power to determine and prevent "unfair" practices.
Not until the mid-1960's, in the cases of Atlantic Refining Co. v.
F.T.C.'7 and F.T.C. v. Brown Shoe Co., Inc.,"8 did the Supreme Court take
another significant stride forward in construing Section 5. Both cases involved franchise tie-in arrangements in which manufacturers offered special
benefits to those retailers who would agree not to buy competitive lines of
merchandise. The Court expressly rejected the old limitations laid down in
Gratz and its progeny, and held the Commission had "broad powers to declare trade practices unfair," especially those conflicting with the basic antitrust policies. 19 However, the Court also found serious antitrust violations
in both cases.
In light of the Brown Shoe and Atlantic Refining Co. decisions, it might
seem that the S&H ruling was no surprise. However, it must be noted that
the S&H case was the first time the Court had addressed itself to the narrow
issue of the Commission's power to determine "unfair practices" outside an
antitrust setting. In fact, the Commission had issued its ruling against S&H
on traditional antitrust grounds. Although Commission counsel argued the
"unfairness to consumers" doctrine on appeal, the Court ruled it was bound
to review the Commission's opinion as originally written. The Court agreed
with the court of appeals that no anti-competition violation was demonstrated, but in remanding the case to the Commission for further rulings, the
Court seemed to imply that all that was lacking was adequate explanation
from the Commission of the basis for its determination that the S&H prac20
tice was unfair to consumers.
The Court summarized its interpretation of Section 5 with the statement:
Thus, legislative and judicial authorities alike convince us that the
Federal Trade Commission does not arrogate excessive power to itself if, in measuring a practice against the elusive, but congressionally mandated standard of fairness, it, like a Court of equity,
considers public values beyond simply those enshrined in the letter
or encompassed in the spirit of the anti-trust laws. 2 1
In the wake of the S&H decision, several questions arise as to how the
Commission will attempt to exercise this broad equity power. What guidelines will it use to make determinations of "public values" and "unfairness"?
Will the "elusiveness" of the standard cause later courts to limit the reme17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

381 U.S. 357 (1965).
384 U.S. 316 (1966).
Id. at 320-21.
F.T.C. v. Sperry & Hutchinson, 405 U.S. 233, 246-49.
id. at 244.
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dies available to the Commission? What type of trade practices can the
Commission reach which it could not reach before?
Since the unfairness standard in Section 5 is so ambiguous it is not unreasonable to expect the Federal Trade Commission to make some attempt
to produce a policy statement in this area. Since the S&H decision was
handed down the Commission staff has retreated within its walls to formulate such a policy statement. The only evidence of the Commission's thinking to date is contained in the 1964 "Statement of Basis and Purpose of
Trade Regulation 408" (Unfair or Deceptive Advertising and Labelling of
Cigarettes in Relation to the Health Hazard Smoking) and cited by the
S&H Court, which included questions as to:
1. whether the practice, without necessarily having been previously considered unlawful, offends public policy as it has
been established by statutes, the common law or otherwisewhether, in other words, it is within at least the penumbra of
common-law, statutory or other established concept of unfairness;
2. whether it is immoral, unethical, oppressive or unscrupulous;
3. whether it causes substantial injury to consumers (or competi22
tors or other businessmen).
Although such definitions might give some indication of the Commission's
guidelines, it may not be of much help in the sense of evaluating any specific
trade practices for the sake of uncertain businessmen. The business world,
however, will be put on notice that the scope of the Commission's power has
been greatly expanded in the direction of protecting consumer interests.
Clearly the Commission's unfairness standard will have to develop on a
case-by-case basis and future courts will look carefully at any rationale used
to apply such an uncertain doctrine. 23 In the same sense, courts may be
reluctant to mete out harsh punishments in cases, such as S&H, where the
challenged practice was well within the previously established law.
There is much speculation as to the directions in which the Federal Trade
Commission will move initially in applying the "unfairness" doctrine. One
large area which may be considered is "unconscionability" with regard to
contract provisions. Contracts, especially concerning credit, conditional retail sales and housing, have long been a consumer troublespot. The concept
of unconscionability, itself rather elusive, could be embraced under the
22. 29 Fed. Reg. 8355 (1964); Id. at 244-45 n.5.
23. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80 (1943).
According to the so-called
Chenery Doctrine, proper judicial review of an administrative agency ruling "requires
that the grounds upon which the administrative agency acted be clearly disclosed and
adequately sustained." Id. at 94.
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Commission's "equity" powers and wielded to strike down oppressive and
unscrupulous contract provisions.
A great deal of the Commission's consumer protection efforts at the present time are focused on the field of advertising, specifically to produce less
misleading and more informative ads. The misleading ads have been targets
in the past, but the unfairness doctrine could now be arguably invoked in instances where the Commission believes advertisers have not supplied enough
pertinent information to consumers.
In a speech before the American Marketing Association in April, 1972,24
one month after the S&H decision, Gerald T. Thain, Assistant Director of
National Advertising in the Federal Trade Commission's Bureau of Consumer Protection, remarked that the case "sets up a new context" for Federal Trade Commission action. He asserted, however, that the broad range
of standards granted the Commission would not necessarily lead to new exercises of authority but would certainly serve to reinforce present policies.
Mr. Thain singled out several innovative Federal Trade Commission policies
currently in question: the Commission's attacks on unfair claims of uniqueness, spurious product differentation claims and corrective ad remedies.
"We take the recent decision as an affirmation that the scope of our efforts
has been proper," he stated.
The full impact of the S&H decision remains to be seen, but clearly the
Supreme Court's recognition of the Federal Trade Commission's broad authority to determine "unfair" practices has given consumers a potentially
powerful federal friend.
Thomas Gilliss

CRIMINAL LAW: Adams v. Williams: An Expansion of the
Terry Rule; Reasonable Grounds for a Stop and Frisk; Use of
Uncorroborated Informant; Probable Cause to Arrest; Possession
of a Firearm-Connecticut Law

On July 12, 1972, the Supreme Court decided Adams v. Williams,' a habeas
24. Address by Gerald T. Thairi, Am. Marketing Ass'n Convention, in New York
City, April 6, 1972.
1. 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
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corpus proceeding 2 based on the unconstitutionality of the respondent's frisk
and arrest, and a search of his person and automobile incident to that arrest.
Mr. Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court, 8 and Justices Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall dissented in separate opinions.
Robert Williams was convicted in Connecticut state court of illegal possession of a handgun found during a stop and frisk, and possession of heroin,
found in the search of the respondent and his car incident to his arrest for illegal possession of a handgun. This conviction was affirmed by the Connecticut Supreme Court, 4 and certiorari was denied by the United States Supreme
Court.5
Police Sergeant John Connolly was on patrol car duty in an area "noted
for its high incidence of crimes of various kinds"6 in Bridgeport, Connecticut
at approximately 2:15 A.M. "There he met a person known to him and
considered by him to be trustworthy and reliable,"7 who pointed out an automobile parked on the other side of the street and told Connolly that a person
seated in the autpmobile had a pistol at his waist and narcotics in his possession. The informant, however, had given information only one time before
and this did not involve firearms or illegal drug possession, but rather concerned homosexual activity. The information as to the latter was never sub8
stantiated, and no arrests resulted.
Connolly approached the vehicle, rapped on the window, and ordered the
respondent to open the door. The engine was not running, and the respondent was sitting peacefully on the passenger side of the car. In response, the
respondent rolled down the window. Connolly immediately reached to the
occupant's waist and removed a .32-caliber revolver from his waistband,
subsequently proven to have been fully loaded. He placed Williams under
arrest for possession of a concealed weapon without a permit and thoroughly
searched him and the vehicle. The search disclosed, among other things,
twenty-one packets of heroin in Williams' wallet and six packets in his pocket. 9
2. The writ of habeas corpus was denied by the United States District Court for
the District of Connecticut; this denial was affirmed, 436 F.2d 30 (2d Cir. 1970);
but en banc the Court of Appeals reversed, 441 F.2d 394 (2d Cir. 1971). Certiorari
was granted, 404 U.S. 1014 (1972).
3. The Chief Justice and Justices White, Stewart, Blackmun and Powell joined in
the majority opinion.

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

157 Conn. 114, 249 A.2d 245 (1968).
395 U.S. 927 (1969).
436 F.2d 30, 31 (1970).
Id.
Id. at 36 (Friendly, J., dissenting).

9. See State v. Williams, 157 Conn. 114, 116-17, 249 A.2d 245, 246 (1968);
Williams v. Adams, 436 F.2d 30, 31-32 and 36 (2d Cir. 1970); and Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 144-45 and 147-48 (1972).
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The Supreme Court held that "[the heroin was] properly admitted at
Williams' trial"'10 because 1) the gun was seized pursuant to a stop and frisk
squarely within the Terry rule;'1 2) the possession of the gun constituted
probable cause to arrest for possession of a handgun without a permit; 12 and
3) the search of Williams' car and his person was incident to that arrest.'5
In Terry v. Ohio,' 4 the Court held:
. . . [W]here a police officer observes unusual conduct which
leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that
criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom
he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in the
course of investigating this behavior he identifies himself as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the
initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear
for his own . . . safety, he is entitled

.

. .

to conduct a carefully

limited search of outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to
discover weapons which might be used to assault him.' 5
In Terry, the arresting officer had observed the defendant and two companions for a considerable length of time apparently "casing" a robbery. When
he approached and asked them to identify themselves and their purpose, he
received evasive mumblings. The officer then frisked the defendant by patting him on his outer clothing, felt a gun, reached inside to remove it, and
placed him under arrest for possession of a concealed weapon.' 6 In the
Adams opinion, Justice Rehnquist was satisfied that the gun seized from Williams pursuant to the stop and frisk was probable cause for arrest, also. He
wrote: "[t]he loaded gun seized as a result of this intrusion [the reaching
for the gun] was therefore admissible [under Terry v. Ohio. .... ],,17
The Court took great pains in Adams to satisfy the requirements established in the Terry holding. The facts in Terry appear to suggest that three
indices are necessary for there to be reasonable grounds for a stop and frisk:
a) personal observation by the police officer; b) suspicious activity that
would lead him to believe that criminal activity is afoot; and c) reasonable
10. 407 U.S. 143, 149 (1972).
11. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
12. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 29-35 provides:

No person shall carry any pistol or revolver upon his person . . . without a
permit to carry the same issued as provided in section 29-28.
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 29-37 provides for a penalty of not more than one thousand
dollars or imprisonment for not more than five years or both, and the handgun is
forfeited.
13. The Supreme Court cites Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949) and
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
14. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).

15. Id. at 30.
16. Id. at 5-7.

17. 407 U.S. 143, 148 (1972).
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grounds for the police officer to believe that the person with whom he is dealing is armed.18
Regarding personal observations by the policeman of the suspicious activity, the majority in Adams states:
. . .[W]e reject respondent's argument that reasonable cause for
a stop and frisk can only be based on the officer's personal observation, rather than on information supplied by another person. 19
The court adds the observations by the police officer which made the frisk
reasonable, namely: "the failure of the respondent to open the door and get
out as requested made the revolver bec[o]me an even greater threat; ' 20 and
the fact that the revolver was found, where it was alleged to be, substantiated

the informant's tip.2 ' Obviously, the first observation relies on the veracity
and reliability of the informant, and the second is circular. 22 Justice Rehnquist did discuss the reliability of the informant in his opinion. He stated:
• . . [W]hile the Court's decisions indicate that this informant's
unverified tip may have been insufficient for a narcotics arrest or
search warrant, .

.

. the information carried enough indicia of re-

liability to justify the officer's forcible stop of Williams.28

18. The majority in Terry did not make it clear whether the frisk follows as a direct result of the stop, or whether the purpose of the stop is somewhat determinative
of whether the frisk is reasonable, or whether the frisk requires a separate basis for
determination of reasonableness. Justice Harlan attempted to clarify this point considerably in his concurring opinion:
In the first place, if the frisk is justified in order to protect the officer
during an encounter with a citizen, the officer must first have constitutional
grounds to insist on an encounter, to make a forcible stop. Any person, including a policeman, is at liberty to avoid a person he considers dangerous.
If and when a policeman has a right instead to disarm such a person for his
own protection, he must first have a right not to avoid him but to be in his
presence. That right must be more than the liberty .. . to address questions to other persons, for ordinarily the person addressed has an equal right
to ignore his interrogator and walk away; he certainly need not submit to a
frisk for the questioner's protection. I would make it perfectly clear that the
right to frisk .. .depends upon the reasonableness of a forcible stop to investigate a suspected crime.
. .. Just as a full search incident to a lawful arrest requires no additional justification, a limited frisk incidental to a lawful stop must often be
rapid and routine. There is no reason why an officer, rightfully but forcibly
confronting a person suspected of a serious crime, should have to ask one
question and take the risk that the answer might be a bullet.
392 U.S. at 32, 33 (1968).
19. 407 U.S. 143, 147 (1972).
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. The majority does not discuss, and seems to ignore, a long line of precedents
which make it quite clear that the fruits of an illegal search do not cure the constitutional infirmity of that search. Chief Justice Warren stated quite clearly in Terry v.
Ohio that: "[wie emphatically reject this notion [that stop and frisk is outside the
Fourth Amendment]." 392 U.S. 1, 16 (1968).

23. 407 U.S. 143, 147 (1972).
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Part of the indicies was what the frisk turned up, however.
The informant's tip again supplied the reasonable basis for believing
criminal activity was underway. The majority gained some satisfaction from
the fact that "under Connecticut law, the informant herself [sic] might have
24
been subject to immediate arrest for making a false complaint."
Having justified the stop and frisk, the Court turned its attention to the
probable cause for arrest. The Court stated that the discovery of the gun
tended to corroborate the informant's tip (including the information regarding
the heroin possession) and "together with the surrounding circumstances
certaintly suggested no lawful explanation for the possession of the gun."'25
Therefore, there was probable cause to arrest for possession of a concealed
weapon without a permit.2 6 In effect, the Court presumed that a person reportedly carrying heroin had no permit for a gun. 27 Finally, the Court up28
held the search as incident to that arrest.
Justice Rehnquist, in reliance on the informant's tip, established a far less
constrained test of reasonableness for stop and frisk. He made it quite clear,
however, that there was no probable cause to arrest at the time Sergeant
Connolly approached the car. 29 In the last analysis the majority answered
the question as to whether or not an uncorroborated informant's tip is reasonable grounds for a stop and frisk in the affirmative. What the Court ignored, however, was the reasonableness of the stop in the first place, separately determined. Judge Friendly, in the Circuit Court of Appeals decision,
felt that such a determination was the threshold problem of this case.8 0 And
in his opinion, the determination should be against the reasonableness of the
stop; and the frisk was based on that unreasonable stop. 3 1 The Supreme
Court, on the other hand, assumed the reasonableness of the initial stop; the
frisk was based on the informant's tip.32
The three dissenting Justices wrote separate opinions, but all agreed on two
points: that Judge Friendly was correct below when he wrote that there were
insufficient grounds for the initial stop of the respondent; and that Terry was
24. Id. at 146-47.
25. Id. at 148-49.
26. Id. at 149.
27. Id. at 150 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
28. Id. at 149, citing Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949) and Carrol
v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
29. Judge Friendly, in his dissent in the first hearing below, made it quite clear
that the criteria of Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959) for informant corroboration, and Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964), and Spinelli v. United States,
393 U.S. 410 (1969) for probable cause were not present here.
30. 436 F.2d 30, 35 (2d Cir. 1970) citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 32 (Harlan,
J.,
concurring) (1968).
31. Id.
32. 407 U.S. 143, 146 (1972).
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intended to be narrowly applied. The majority rejected both of these contentions.
Justice Douglas agreed with the lower court decision of Judge Friendly,
but he added that mere possession of a concealed weapon in Connecticut is
not probable cause to arrest without a prior determination of the question of
a permit. Furthermore, such a determination cannot be made by a more intensified frisk. Such is outside the scope of Terry and not provided for by
statute in Connecticut. 33 In addition, Justice Douglas argued extensively
that police protection and the fourth amendment would be better furthered
by strict gun control legislation. 34 He closed his dissent with a reiteration of
the concern expressed by Judge Friendly:
If it [the Terry rule] is to be extended . . . [to include possessory

offenses] at all, this should be only where observation by the officer himself or well authenticated information shows "that criminal
activity may be afoot." (Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30
(1968).)3 5
Justice Brennan also supported the reasoning of Judge Friendly that there
were no reasonable grounds for the stop and frisk, but he merely quotes at
length from the dissenting opinion below.3 6 The important points emphasized were that the informant was unnamed, was not shown to be reliable,
87
and no information was given to show personal knowledge.
Justice Marshall's dissent is founded on two arguments: 1) there were no
reasonable grounds for the stop; and 2) even if the stop and frisk was reasonable, there was no probable cause to arrest. With regard to the reasonableness of the stop, he said:
Terry did not hold that whenever a policeman has a hunch that a
citizen is engaging in criminal activity, he may engage in a stop and
frisk.

* * * When we legitimated the conduct of the officer in

Terry we did so because of the substantial reliability
of the infor38
mation on which the officer based his decision to act.
In Justice Marshall's opinion it is clear that the requisite reliability of the information was not present in the instant case. However, Justice Marshall
33. Id. at 149-50.
34. Id. at 150-51. Justice Douglas uses the dissent in this case to reiterate his opinion that gun control legislation would be constitutional under the second amendment.
Douglas feels that the governmental response to the high incidence of crimes should not
be the diminishment of fourth amendment protections. In his opinion the Court has
responded to society's fears and ignored the Constitution.
35. Id. at 151 citing 436 F.2d 30, 39 (Friendly, J., dissenting) (2d Cir. 1970).
36. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals en banc, 441 F.2d 394 (2d Cir. 1971),
reversed the decision of a panel, 436 F.2d 30 (2d Cir. 1970). Judge Friendly's extensive opinion is found in the dissent in the earlier case.
37. Id. at 151-53.
18. 407 U.S. 143, 158 (1972) (Marshall, J.; dissenting).
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would also overrule the conviction on the grounds that there was no probable
cause to arrest even if, arguendo, the stop and frisk was reasonable. The officer never asked whether or not the respondent had a permit to carry the
gun. Without that information there was not a sufficient basis to assume
that there was no permit. He concluded his dissent with a concession to
Douglas' long dissent in Terry, in which he cautioned that "powerful hydraulic pressures . . . bear heavily on the Court to water down Constitutional
guarantees .....
8 Marshall saw, as a result of the opinion in Adams, arbitrary police action supported to the detriment of fourth amendment protections.
Professor of Law Wayne R. LaFave 40 argues effectively that there is a balance between the extent of the intrustion upon fourth amendment protections and the reasonableness of the intrusion. In fact, Judge Friendly cited
this article in his opinion.41 But in Adams v. Williams, the Court is too quick
to affirm the conviction and fails to effectively delineate the reasonableness
of the police action. The result has been a broadening of the Terry standards
to such an extent that few police stops, and frisks incident to those stops, will
be considered unconstitutional. The end result could be the watering down
of the fourth amendment guarantees which Justice Marshall foreshadowed
in his dissent. What cannot be justified as an arrest and search may well
be justified as a stop and frisk, even if the justification is as shaky as that in
42
Adams v. Williams.
John G. Whelley, Jr.

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW-Telecommunications-FCC Rule Requiring CATV Systems to Operate As Local Outlets By Cablecasting Is Reasonably Ancillary to the Performance of the Commission's Responsibilities for the Regulation of TV Broadcasting.
United States v. Midwest Video Corp. 406 U.S. 649 (1972)

Respondent, an operator of community antenna television (CATV) systems,
challenged a Federal Communications Commission (FCC) rule that "no
39. Id. at 161 citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 39 (1968).
40. W. LaFave, "Street Encounters" and the Constitution: Terry, Sibron, Peters,
and Beyond, 67 MICH. L. REV. 40 (1968-69).
41. 436 F.2d 30, 37 (Friendly, J., dissenting) (2d Cir. 1970).
42. 407 U.S. 143, 154-55 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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CATV system having 3,500 or more subscribers shall carry the signal of any
television broadcast station unless the sytem also operates to a significant extent as a local outlet by cablecasting [i.e., originating programs]." 1 The
Court of Appeals 2 set aside the regulation on the ground that the FCC had
no authority to issue it.3 On review the Supreme Court reversed and held
that the rule is within the FCC's statutory authority to regulate CATV to
the extent that it is "reasonably ancillary" to the performance of the Commission's responsibilities as set out in United States v. Southwestern Cable
Co. 4
The FCC was created by, and its various responsibilities and duties detailed in, the Communications Act of 1934. 5 The specific powers and duties
relied on by the Commission in formulating the rules on originating programs are those in 47 U.S.C. § 151 et seq.6 The broadest reading of FCC
powers is found in § 303(g) which states that "Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, the Commission from time to time, as public convenience, interest, or necessity requires, shall(g) Study new uses for radio,

. .

.

and generally encourage the larger and

more effective use of radio in the public interest;"'7 the act applies to all "interstate and foreign communication by wire or radio".8 The "stream of
communication" 9 doctrine was used in Southwestern to ascertain the interstate character of CATV 10 while also determining CATV to be within the
Act's definitions of wire and radio communications. 1 '
After Southwestern, there was no further question as to the inclusion of
CATV within the regulatory province of the FCC, as long as the regulation
of CATV could be viewed as reasonably ancillary to the Commission's
1. 47 C.F.R. § 74.1111(a) (1971). The regulation has been revised and now appears at 47 C.F.R. § 76.201(a) (1972).
2. 441 F.2d 1322 (8th Cir. 1971).
3. 47 U.S.C. § 402(a) (1970) and 28 U.S.C. § 2342(1) (1970) grant the right of
review of FCC rules and regulations to the United States Courts of Appeals.
4. 392 U.S. 157 (1968).
5. 48 Stat. 1064 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. (1970).
6. The Commission's FIRST REPORT AND ORDER, 20 F.C.C.2d 201, 223 (1969)
cited as authority for its actions, §H 2, 3, 4(ij), 301, 303, 307, 308, 309, 315, and 317.
Of those sections, §H 2(a) 303 and 307 were recognized by the Court as directly applicable to the program origination requirement.
7. 47 U.S.C. § 303(g) (1970).
8. 47 U.S.C. § 152(a) (1970).
9. This doctrine was formulated and applied to radio communications in Federal
Radio Comm'n v. Nelson Bros. Co., 289 U.S. 266 (1933).
10. 392 U.S. at 168-69.
11. Id. at 168. The Act's definitions of communication by wire and by radio are
found at 47 U.S.C. § 153(a,b) (1970).
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regulation of television broadcasting. 2 The controversy in the instant case
arises from the challenge which the program origination requirement presents to the "reasonably ancillary" test and is based on the technical differences between CATV and television broadcasting. CATV systems have
developed fundamentally in a reception mode, being primarily or exclusively
engaged in either facilitating satisfactory reception of local stations or transmitting to subscribers the signals of distant stations beyond the range capabilities of local antennas.' 3 Television broadcasting, in contrast, involves the
origination of the signal to be received.' 4 While some CATV systems have
voluntarily engaged in program origination, the development of its recognized
potential for such operation remains for the future. 15
As CATV systems have developed and played a rapidly increasing role in
the nationwide communications network, the FCC has' assumed regulatory
authority in addition to that explicitly provided for in the Comminications
Act of 1934.16 The FCC has examined the newly developing systems from
their beginnings and has conducted hearings concerning CATV in the normal course of its proceedings. 17 The specific examination leading to the
promulgation of the program origination requirement began in 1968, when
the FCC issued its Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Notice of Inquiry. s
This notice was followed by further hearings, submission of comments by
interested parties, and final adoption of the program origination requirement
on October 24, 1969.19 Thus, after the successful challenge of the adopted
12. 392 U.S. at 178. The Court phrased the "reasonably ancillary" test as a restriction on the FCC's authority while refusing to go into a more exacting determination of the limits of FCC authority over CATV. Midwest Video Corp. filed a brief
as amicus curiae in support of Southwestern's position. Brief for Black Hills Video
Corp. and Midwest Video Corp. as Amicus Curiae, United States v. Southwestern
Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968).
13. A general background into the technical operation of CATV is provided in
Chazen, Federal Regulation of Cable Television: The Visible Hand, 83 H&Av. L. REV.
1820 (1970). For a comprehensive study of CATV see, ON THE CABLE: THE TELEVISION OF ABUNDANCE,

REPORT OF THE SLOAN

COMMISSION

ON CABLE

COMMUNICA-

TIONS (1971).

14. The distinctions between broadcasting and reception were strengthened and relied on in Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390, 399-401
(1968), as a basis of the holding that CATV systems which carried copyrighted
motion pictures were not infringing on the copyright holders' exclusive performance
rights under the Copyright Act of 1909, 17 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (1970).
15. See NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULEMAKING AND NOTICE OF INQUIRY, 15 F.C.C.2d
417, 419-20 (1968).
16. See, Chazen, note 13 supra, at 1823 for a listing of attempts to gain specific
Congressional authority. See also, 392 U.S. at 170-71.
17. The prime result of that examination has been the FCC's FIRST REPORT AND
and its SECOND REPORT AND ORDER, 2 F.C.C.2d 725
ORDER, 38 F.C.C. 683 (1965)
(1966). The numerous hearings which were the basis of those reports are cited within

the reports.
18. 15 F.C.C.2d 417 (1968).
19. FIRST REPORT AND ORDER, 20 F.C.C.2d 201 (1969).

This report was to re-

19731

Case Notes

order in the Court of Appeals, the question of the FCC's regulatory author-

ity over CATV was once again before the Supreme Court.
In reversing, the Supreme Court carefully detailed what it considered to
be the proper source of the FCC's authority in this instance. 20 In supporting
that authority, the Court involved itself in a close examination of the public
interest asserted by the FCC while stepping quietly by the distinctions of
Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc.21 into the increasingly
burdened "reasonably ancillary" test of Southwestern.
Prior to delving back into the "reasonably ancillary" test of Southwestern,
the Court reasserts § 2(a) of the Communications Act 2 2 as the basis of the
FCC's regulatory authority by reading Southwestern to hold that: " . . .
§ 2(a) is itself a grant of regulatory power and not merely a prescription of
the forms of communication to which the Act's other provisions . . . apply" 23
The Court then repeats the admonitions of FCC v. Pottsville
Broadcasting Co. 24 and National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 25 as

dictated in Southwestern,2 0 to the effect that the Communications Act conferred upon the FCC a regulatory authority with sufficient flexibility to adjust
itself to the rapidly changing character of communications technology. The
analysis of the Commission's authority continued with an evaluation of the
objectives for which the Commission's regulatory power over CATV might
be exercised. It is at this point that the issue of the case is cast into the
"reasonably ancillary" test of Southwestern.
quire the program origination requirement to take effect on January 1, 1971. On petitions for reconsideration, the effective date was delayed until April 1, 1971; MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER, 23 F.C.C.2d 825, 827 (1970).
The petitions for reconsideration were denied and then, after the requirement was successfully challenged in the Court of Appeals, the effective date was suspended pending final judgment in the instant case.
20. In delivering its opinions the Court presents strange bedfellows on both sides of
the fence. In light of the more prevalent division of the Court this term, it is a matter
of at least some curiosity to see the Court divide as it does here. The decision can
most properly be characterized as a 4-1-4 split rather than 5-4, with Chief Justice
Burger being the reluctant fence-straddler concurring in the result. The prevailing
opinion was delivered by Justice Brennan, joined by Justices White, Marshall, and
Blackmun. Justice Douglas filed a dissent in which Justices Stewart, Powell, and Rehnquist joined.
21. See note 14, supra.
22. 47 U.S.C. § 152(a) (1970).
23. 406 U.S. at 660.
24. 309 U.S. 134, 138 (1940): "[ulnderlying the whole [Communications Act]
is recognition of the rapidly fluctuating factors characteristic of the evolution of broadcasting and of the corresponding requirement that the administrative process possess
sufficient flexibility to adjust itself to these factors." This is of special note here since
CATV did not come into existence until well after the enactment of the Communications Act.
25. 319 U.S. 190, 219 (1943) stating that Congress gave the Commission "a comprehensive mandate" with "not niggardly, but expansive powers."
26. 392 U.S. at 172-73.
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The explosive growth of CATV and its importation of distant signals is
recognized by the Court here2 7 and in Southwestern28 as threatening an assumed public interest in the maintenance of local programming. The FCC,
in the performance of its responsibilities for the regulation of television
broadcasting, may issue "such rules and regulations and prescribe such restrictions and conditions" as "public convenience, interest, or necessity requires. ' 29 Although the Court also cites § 303(g) 30 ". . [to] generally encourage the larger and more effective use of radio in the public
interest. . . .", and § 307(b)3 1 , the licensing provisions, the subsequent
analysis makes clear the public interest foundation of the reasonably ancillary claim. 32 Once this foundation is laid, the structure of the "reasonably
ancillary" argument is easy to discern.
The public interest recognized by the FCC is that of"...
increasing the
number of outlets for community self-expression and augmenting the public's choice of programs and types of services."83 Associated Press v. United
States supported the basic tenet that "the widest possible dissemination of
information from diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare
of the public. ' 34 The threat of CATV in its present developmental stage to
the existence of local television broadcasting requires regulatory action in
some manner to maintain these goals.3 5 It is thus the Commission's goal"6
of maintaining the public's access to local broadcasting that allows the Court
27. 406 U.S. at 651.

28. 392 U.S. at 175.
29. 47 U.S.C. § 303(r) (1970).

30. Id. § 303(g).
31. Id. § 307(b).
32. The Court specifically refuses to consider basing the regulatory authority on
47 U.S.C. § 303. Soe 406 U.S. at 656-57, n.13. This section would base the
grant of regulatory authority on the Commission's power to authorize CATV to engage
in radio communications. The authority to engage in radio communications may be
conditioned upon reasonable requirements related to the radio communication, [i.e.,
program origination].
33. 20 F.C.C.2d at 202 (1969).
34. 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945). These same objectives were recognized in National
Broadcasting Co. and given emphasis by the Court in the instant case, 406 U.S. at
668-69.
35. The threat of CATV is that a small number of the nation's television stations
will be broadcast via cable throughout the nation, thereby limiting the public's choice
of programming and access to local stations. This threat in a different manifestation
was met by the FCC and upheld in the courts when the FCC passed its prime time
access rule, 47 C.F.R. § 73.658j, k (1971), limiting the nation's television networks'
control of prime television time. See Mt. Mansfield Television, Inc. v. F.C.C., 472
F.2d 470 (2nd Cir. 1971).
36. The FCC's goal is stated as follows in its SECOND REPORT AND ORDER, 2
F.C.C.2d 725, 746 (1966): "[Olur goal here is to integrate the CATV service into
the national television structure in such a way as to promote maximum television service to all people of the United States .......
This goal is accepted as valid by the
Court. 406 U.S. at 668.
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to conclude, "In sum, the regulation preserves and enhances the integrity of
broadcast signals and therefore is 'reasonably ancillary to the effective performance of the Commission's various responsibilities for the regulation of
television broadcasting.' 37 The Commission has asserted that its "concern
with CATV carriage of broadcast signals is not just a matter of avoidance of
adverse effects, but extends also to requiring CATV affirmatively to further
statutory policies."38 The Court views this affirmative duty to further statutory policies to be sufficient justification for the FCC to enact its program
origination requirement in spite of the difference in technical character between program origination and the traditional CATV reception and rebroadcast functions. The Court concludes its analysis by rejecting any importance of those differences by stating that "CATV operators to whom the
cablecasting rule applies have voluntarily engaged themselves in providing
that service, and the Commission seeks only to ensure that it satisfactorily
meets community needs within the context of their undertaking. 8' 9
Any attack on the Court's decision must be based on the ease with
which the majority dismissed the broadcasting-reception distinction. The
dissent would hold that the majority's decision strains the limits of FCC authority beyond allowable statutory limitations. Mr. Justice Douglas confined himself to the characterization of CATV as "simply a carrier" and
bases that distinction on the Court's prior decision in Fortnightly.40 While
seemingly well-founded, the dissent's reliance on the distinctions of Fortnightly must be put in the context of Southwestern"" and the time and
purpose perspective of the two cases. Southwestern was handed down merely one week before Fortnightly and dealt specifically with FCC authority
over CATV while Fortnightly was limited to an examination of the performance of copyrighted works as applied to CATV and in no way dealt
with FCC regulatory authority. As the majority states, Fortnightly " . . .
has no bearing on the 'reasonably ancillary' question". 41 If Fortnightly
is to be used against FCC assertion of authority over CATV, its arguments
could presumably have been used by the Court in its consideration of the
37. 406 U.S. at 670. The Court's opinion was divided into two sections; the first
examining the FCC's statutory authority and the second determining whether substantial evidence supported the exercise of that authority. The first question is the decisive one since the Court is presented with more than substantial evidence that the
regulation will promote the public interest. The Court goes so far as to say that the
lower court's finding of a lack of substantial evidence was "patently incorrect in light
of the record." 406 U.S. at 671.
38. 15 F.C.C.2d at 422. This assertion is strongly agreed to by the Court. 406
U.S. at 664.
39. 406 U.S. at 670.
40. Id. at 678.
41. Id. at 664.

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 22:684

Southwestern case when the "reasonably ancillary" test was being formulated. The conflict as presented by the dissent is not dependent on any issue
which did not exist when Southwestern was heard.
The fears of the dissent as to excessive power of the FCC over CATV in
the area of program origination are likely to become moot within a short
time in any event. 42 The technical advancement of CATV and its true potential43 are in the precise area in which the FCC, by virtue of the program
origination requirement, is now causing the larger systems to develop and
practice. As the benefits of CATV become more widely experienced, program origination and other technical services will likely become a matter of
expectation rather than FCC requirement. It is in furthering this technical
advancement that the FCC is best serving its statutory mandate to "generally
encourage the larger and more effective use of radio in the public interest;"'44.
Theodore W. Urban

42. In a related area of FCC regulation, however, a basis for testing the strength
and scope of the Midwest Video decision is already developing. FCC rules governing
pay-cablecasting, found in 47 CFR § 76.225 (1972), are currently the subject of review.
The rules were formulated in the FCC's MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER, 23
F.C.C.2d 825 (1970), and petitions for reconsideration directed to the pay-cablecasting
rules were denied on July 24, 1972. However, a new rule-making proceeding to review the existing rules and consider changes was granted. In the current proceedings,
challengers of the pay-cablecasting rules are denying that Midwest Video or Southwestern support the Commission's attempt to adopt the pay-cablecasting restrictions.
See, Comments of the Department of Justice, In the Matter of Amendment of Part 76,
Subpart G, of the Commission's Rules and Regulations Pertaining to the Cablecasting
of Programs for Which a Per-Program or Per-Channel Charge is Made, Docket No.
19554, submitted on November 1, 1972. Should these rules eventually be challenged
in court, the resulting decisions will of necessity further define the "reasonably ancillary" test of Southwestern and determine whether the outer limits of FCC jurisdiction over CATV have yet been reached.
43. See note 13, supra.
44. 47 U.S.C. § 303(g) (1970).
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: A Parolee's Constitutional Rights to
Due Process are Violated by the Revocation of Parole Without a
Hearing that Observes Certain Minimal Due Process Requirements. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972).

John J. Morrissey was paroled in June of 1968,1 and seven months later arrested as a parole violator. The Iowa Board of Parole reviewed the parole
officer's written report and then revoked Morrissey's parole. After exhausting his state remedies, Morrissey petitioned the U.S. District Court for a writ
of habeas corpus. He alleged his constitutional rights to due process were
violated when his parole was revoked without a hearing. The District Court
denied his petition, holding that a hearing was not required.2 The Court of
Appeals affirmed.3 The Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari,4 and
reversed the lower courts, holding that a parolee's constitutional rights to due
process are violated by revocation of his parole without a hearing observing
certain minimal due process requirements. 5
Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Burger noted "that the liberty of a parolee, although indeterminate, includes many of the core values of unqualified
liberty and its termination inflicts a 'grievous loss' on the parolee and often on
others."'6 Thus, the parolee's liberty, the Court held, is protected by the fourteenth amendment. The requirements of due process in a parole revocation
hearing were then explained by the Court. The hearings are to be held in
two stages. The first stage is a preliminary hearing held as promptly as convenient after the parolee's arrest and detainment. The purpose of this early
hearing is to determine if there is probable cause or reasonable grounds
1. In January, 1967, Morrissey was convicted of forgery in an Iowa state court and
was sentenced for a term of imprisonment not to exceed seven years.
2. In an unreported opinion, Morrissey's petition was denied because of the controlling authority of Curtis v. Bennett. In Curtis v. Bennett, 256 Iowa 1164, 131
N.W.2d 1 (1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 958 (1965), the Supreme Court of Iowa held
that a parolee had no constitutional right to a hearing before a parole board could
revoke his parole. The eighth circuit adopted this view in Curtis v. Bennett, 351
F.2d 931 (8th Cir. 1965) noting, "Federal due process does not require that a parole
revocation be predicated upon notice and opportunity to be heard."

351 F.2d at 933.

3. Morrissey v. Brewer, 443 F.2d 942 (8th Cir. 1971) (en banc). The Circuit
Court consolidated Morrissey's appeal with that of G. Donald Booher. Booher's experience and claims mirror Morrissey's and the Supreme Court's decision covered both
of their appeals, 408 U.S. 471, 473-74 (1972). The lower court opinion follows most of
the standard reasons for denying a parole revocation hearing. These include the finding
that parole is a privilege, not a right, the constructive custody theory, the contract
theory and the importance of non-legal, non-adversary considerations in the revocation
decision, etc.
4. 404 U.S. 999 (1971).
5. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
6. Id. at 482.
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to believe the parolee has violated his parole. In this regard due process
requires: 1) notice to the parolee of its location and purpose; 2) notice
to him of what parole violations are alleged; 3) an opportunity for him
to appear and speak in his own behalf; 4) an opportunity to bring letters,
documents or individuals who can present relevant information and 5) an opportunity for the parolee to question persons giving adverse information (except in instances where the informant would be subjected to the risk of bodily
harm). In addition, the hearing officer must make a summary or digest of
the evidence presented and state the reasons for his decision. 7 The second
stage, convened if desired by the parolee, is a revocation hearing held prior to
the parole authority's final decision. This hearing will be a final evaluation
of any contested facts and a final consideration of whether revocation is warranted. The procedure to be followed in this hearing is much like that to be
followed in the first. The Court noted that the question of representation by
counsel was neither reached nor decided . Justice Brennan, concurring in
the result, felt that due process required that the parolee be allowed to retain
an attorney if he desires one.9 Justice Douglas, dissenting in part, felt that if
the parolee is accused only of violating parole conditions, rather than accused
of an additional illegal act, then due process requires that no arrest or detainment be accomplished before the hearing is held. He also indicated that the
parolee should be entitled to counsel. 10
In responding to the questions raised in this case, the Court first attempted
to place the issue in focus. The Chief Justice wrote, "The essence of parole
is release from prison, before the completion of sentence, on the condition
that the prisoner abide by certain rules during the balance of the sentence.",
Breaking of the rules, or conditions, then, leads to revocation. The appropriateness of a two-step hearing procedure can be seen in the Court's exposition of what revocation entails.
Implicit in the system's concern with parole violations is the notion that the parolee is entitled to retain his liberty as long as he
substantially abides by the conditions of his parole. The first step
in a revocation decision thus involves a wholly retrospective factual
7. Id. at 486-87.
8. Id. at 489. But, note that the separate opinions of concurring Justices find
that the parolee should be allowed to retain an attorney. See text accompanying notes
9-10 infra.

9. 408 U.S. at 491. Justice Brennan states that Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254
(1970) dictates that the parolee be allowed to retain counsel.
10. 408 U.S. at 497-98. In this respect Justice Douglas has adopted the concept
espoused by Circuit Judge Skelly Wright in his separate opinion in Hyser v. Reed, 318

F.2d 225, 262 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Jamison v. Chappell, 375 U.S. 957
(1963).
11. 408 U.S. at 477.
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question: whether the parolee has in fact acted in violation of one
or more conditions of his parole. Only if it is determined that the
parolee did violate the condition does the second question arise:
should the parolee be recommitted to prison or should other steps
be taken to protect society and improve chances of rehabilitation?
The first step is relatively simple; the second is more complex.1 2
The Court then identified and evaluated the various interests involved. The
rights-privilege distinction was held no longer dispositive of the question of
whether due process applies to a particular situation. 13 The parolee's interest
is in his liberty, regardless of how that liberty is limited or conditioned. 1 4 The
state on the other hand has an "overwhelming interest" in being able to return
the parolee to prison without the burden of a new criminal trial. But, the
Court noted, this interest only arises when the parolee has in fact failed to
abide by the conditions of his parole; the state has no interest in revoking a
parole without at least some informal procedural guarantees. 15 Society's interest is in restoring the parolee to a normal and uesful life within the law.
Therefore, it has an interest in preventing erroneous revocation of parole and
in treating the individual with basic fairness. In the words of the Chief Justice,
"fair treatment in parole revocations will enhance the chance of rehabilitation
by avoiding reactions to arbitrariness."' 6 Holding that the interests of all will
be furthered by effective, informal hearings, the Court established the twostage revocation hearing process. Two stages are required because certain
preliminary questions should be answered relatively quickly after the arrest
and detainment of the alleged parole violator and a hearing before a parole
board can take time to organize. 17 The first hearing is a minimal inquiry
conducted at or near the place of arrest or alleged parole violations. This
preliminary hearing should be convened "as promptly as convenient after arrest while information is fresh and sources are available."' 8 The hearing's
purpose would be "to determine whether there is probable cause or reasonable ground to believe that the arrested parolee has committed acts which
12. Id. at 479-80.
13. 408 U.S. at 481. In other words, the question of whether parole is a right or a
privilege was deemed irrelevant to the issue at bar. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254
(1970). The Chief Justice does not cite Goldberg in this instance, but quotes Justice
Blackmun's writing, "this court now has rejected the concept that constitutional rights
turn upon whether a governmental benefit is characterized as a 'right' or as a 'privilege'.
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374 (1971)." 408 U.S. at 481.
14. 408 U.S. 471, 482.
15. 408 U.S. at 483.
16. 408 U.S. at 484. The court below noted, "In holding that a prisoner has no
constitutional right to a hearing upon revocation of his parole, we emphasize, however, that the parolee cannot be made the subject of arbitrary action." 443 F.2d at 950.
17. See text accompanying note 12 supra.
18. 408 U.S. at 485.
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would constitute a violation of parole conditions."' 1 This determination must
be made by someone not directly involved in the case, i.e., not by the parolee's parole officer. The Court pointed out that the decision-maker need not
be a judicial officer, because parole revocation is traditionally an administrative matter. Hence, another parole officer is acceptable as the hearing officer. 20 The second hearing must be held if requested by the parolee. It
"must lead to a final evaluation of any contested relevant facts and consideration of whether the facts as determined warrant revocation."' 21 While the
states will establish their own procedure for these hearings, the procedures
must recognize the minimum requirements of due process. These requirements are quite similar to those of the first hearing, except that the
parolee must be given written notice of the claimed violations of parole and
the hearing must be held before a neutral and detached body. 22 It was
stressed throughout the opinion that the Court is not envisioning a criminal
process hearing in any sense. The Court said that parole revocation is not
an instance of criminal conviction and that disposition of revocation hearings
are better handled by administrative bodies rather than courts of law. 23
There has been a great deal of lower federal court action in recent years
over state parole revocation procedures. 24 In most of these cases, a parolee
whose parole had been revoked petitioned the court claiming that his rights
were violated by the procedures used. The Morrissey decision will not ward
off much of this court action, since it leaves important areas still open for de19. Id.
20. Id. at 486.
21. Id. at 488.
22. 408 US.. at 488-89. The other minimum requirements include: 1) disclosure
to the parolee of evidence against him; 2) opportunity for the parolee to appear, be
heard, and present witnesses and documentary evidence; 3) right of the parolee to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless the hearing officer specifically finds
a good cause for not allowing confrontation); and 4) a written statement by the factfinders identifying the evidence relied on and the reasons for revoking parole.
23. 408 U.S. at 480.
24. Hahn v. Burke, 430 F.2d 100 (7th Cir. 1970) (parole revocation without a
hearing violates due process); Murray v. Page, 429 F.2d 1359 (10th Cir. 1970) (due
process requires the right to be heard at a hearing before parole revocation); Alverez
v. Turner, 422 F.2d 214 (10th Cir. 1970) (a parolee is not entitled to rights of confrontation and cross-examination at a revocation hearing); Rose v. Haskins, 388 F.2d 91
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 946 (1968) (Constitution does not require a hearing
prior to the revocation of parole); Hodge v. Markley, 339 F.2d 973 (7th Cir. 1965)
(parole revocation held proper despite the lack of counsel and the lack of a hearing in
the district of alleged parole violation); Hyser v. Reed, 318 F.2d 225 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied sub nom. Jamison v. Chappell, 375 U.S. 957 (1963) (due process does not
require adversary hearings, appointment of counsel, or cross-examination to revoke
parole); Goolsby v. Gagnon, 322 F. Supp. 460 (E.D. Wis. 1971) (due process requires
a pre-revocation hearing and the appointment of counsel); Hutchison v. Patterson,
267 F. Supp. 433 (D. Colo. 1967) (revocation held proper despite the failure to give a
statement of charges against the parolee).
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bate and, perhaps, defers too much to the state's "overwhelming interest."
For example, the Court refused to reach or decide the question whether due
process requires counsel to be retained or appointed at a parole revocation
hearing. 25 Three members of the Court do say that, at least, the parolee
should have counsel if he desires it, 2 6 but the issue is left untouched by the
majority. The Court's recognition of the state's "overwhelming interest" in
avoiding the burden of a new criminal trial27 could explain why the question
of counsel was not decided. The Court has recognized that counsel can perform valuable services at administrative hearings, 28 but once parolees are allowed to retain counsel, the requirements of the equal protection clause may
force states to appoint counsel to represent indigent parolees facing revocation. 29 The Court seemed to fear that the burden of appointing lawyers
would be too heavy for state parole boards to bear. Nonetheless, the issue
will continue to be litigated and the Court will have to face it again.
During the last fifteen years, the concept of an individual's rights when
facing the police, court and penal systems has been expanded by the Supreme
Court. 30 The Morrissey case is an example of this, but a close reading of the
decision reveals a change in emphasis from pre-1968 decisions. Generally,
earlier decisions forced administrative apparatus to make drastic changes in
day-to-day operating procedures; the "Miranda warnings" are the prime example in this area. However, in Morrissey there is an overt attempt to avoid
disruption of administrative procedure. This is defended on the grounds of
the "overwhelming interest" of the state. Thus, the Court repeatedly stated
that its intention is not to create a criminal hearing out of a parole violation
proceeding. 3 1 This is a notice to parole boards that they need not overhaul
their revocation proceedings. The Court noted that the requirements set out
25. 408 U.S. at 489.
26. Id. at 491 (Brennan, J., concurring), 498 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part). There
are many lower court decisions on this question. See U.S. ex rel. Bey v. Connecticut,
443 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir.), vacated as moot, 404 U.S. 879 (1971) (the parolee is constitutionally entitled to assistance of counsel during the revocation proceeding); Bearden
v. South Carolina, 443 F.2d 1090 (4th Cir. 1971) (Constitution does not require the
appointment of counsel for indigent parolees); Earnest v. Willingham, 406 F.2d 681
(10th Cir. 1969) (a parole board must provide counsel for indigent parolees facing
revocation); Williams v. Patterson, 389 F.2d 374 (10th Cir. 1968) (the lack of counsel
does not render the parole revocation invalid); Washington v. Hagan, 287 F.2d 332
(3d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 970 (1961) (a parolee is not entitled to counsel
at a parole revocation hearing); Martin v. U.S. Board of Parole, 199 F. Supp. 542
(D.D.C. 1961) (parolee is not entitled to have counsel present at a revocation hearing). See note 24 supra.
27. See text accompanying notes 14-15 supra.
28. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 270-71 (1970).
29. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
30. E.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S.
478 (1964); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
31. 408 U.S. at 480, 489.

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 22:684

should not impose a great burden on any parole system. 3 2 Disruption is kept
at a minimum by leaving such discretion to the various parole boards. For
example, the requirement of notice for the first hearing is stated, "the parolee should be given notice." 33 But, for the second hearing, the requirements include "written notice of the claimed violations of parole."'3 4 Does
this mean that written notice is not required in the first hearing? The opinion
would appear to warrant such a conclusion. And, while this will not disrupt
current revocation procedures, undoubtedly such procedures will be challenged for failing to give written notice of claimed violations at both hearings. The second hearing, the one which does determine whether to revoke
parole, is held only when the parolee requests it. 35 The Court does not answer the question whether the parolee must be told a second hearing is available. Here, too, the Court has inadvertently created new grounds for challenging parole revocation procedures. The Court gives hearing officers and
parole boards their broadest discretion when the parolee seeks to confront
those persons giving adverse information. At both hearings, persons giving
adverse information, if the parolee requests, "are to be made available for
questioning in his presence." 136 But this requirement need not be complied
with, for "if the hearing officer determines that the informant would be subjected to risk of harm if his identity were disclosed, he need not be subjected
to confrontation and cross-examination. 3 7 The criterion "that the informant
would be subjected to risk of harm" is difficult to measure and subject to
misuse. The threat of physical harm would be hard to disprove (or prove,
for that matter) and the hearing officer could force an unnecessary accelera38
tion of the revocation process.
The "overwhelming" nature of the state's interest is properly characterized
to the extent that in at least one instance it overwhelms even the fundamentals of the fourteenth amendment. Because of the state's "overwhelming
interest", the Court sanctions a practice that the protections of due process
were intended to eliminate. Without comment, the Court notes:
Sometimes revocation occurs when the parolee is accused of another crime; it is often preferred to a new prosecution because of
the procedural ease of recommitting the individual on the basis of
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

408 U.S. at 490.
Id. at 486.
Id. at 489 (emphasis added).
Id. at 487.
Id.

37. Id.

38. The experience of confrontation and cross-examination could be excluded for
the benefit of a waivering witness, also. Of course, should the parolee have any legitimate grievance about the manner in which his parole was revoked, he may petition for
a writ of habeas corpus or take advantage of any available administrative appeals.
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a lesser showing by the State.3s
Here, the Court seems to be sanctioning the practice of sending an individual
to prison for a crime he has not been convicted of. The individual has not
even had a trial on the issue. This is not a case of the parolee, by his own
volition, breaking the conditions of the parole. Here, he could be a completely
innocent figure, arrested by police because he matched a description, had no
alibi, and had a record. 40 He then could be sent back to prison, without a
criminal trial, possibly without even facing his accuser (threat of bodily
harm), for a crime of which he was never convicted. The use of parole revocation as a short-cut circumventing the requirements of the fourteenth amendment should be condemned, not sanctioned, regardless of the interests involved. Throughout this opinion, the Court is very mindful of the state's interest, while the interests of the parolee have not been given their full accord.
The Morrissey decision, because of the questions it leaves unanswered and
the abuses it sanctions, surely will be questioned.
Perry M. Gould

39. 408 U.S. at 479.
40. The experience of accusation and arrest occurs more frequently to parolees and
ex-convicts because of the police practice of including as suspects anyone in the area
with a conviction for a similar crime.
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